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THE CONCEPT OF PUBLIC SERVICE*
IkON DUGUIT
Everyone is acquainted with the celebrated theory of the Three
States, formulated by the great thinker, Auguste Comte. He taught
that human thought passes successively through three stages: the
theological, during which it is dominated by a belief in the supernatural
and its influence upon terrestrial affairs; the metaphysical, during
which man connects all the phenomena which he beholds with his senses
to entities which are foreign to his experience; and, finally, the posi-
tive, during which man has learned to free himself from theological
or metaphysical beliefs, which he relegates to the domain of the
unknowable, and admits as reality only directly observable facts.
At the period in which we live the above emancipation is complete in
the field of the natural sciences. The physician or chemist no longer
explains the phenomena which he observes by the existence of superior
powers as their productive and conscious cause. They place no longer
behind visible phenomena invisible metaphysical entities, which might
serve as their support and at the same time as their explanation. Phil-
osophers may discourse endlessly upon so-called metaphysical principles.
The scholar, as scholar, takes no notice of them. After a long effort
he has succeeded in freeing himself from religious and metaphysical
ideas and to consider phenomena only by themselves, without regard to
unknown or unknowable causes from which they may originate. In
the realm of psychological sciences the emancipation of beliefs from the
supernatural and the metaphysical is perhaps less complete. Neverthe-
less, in modern times a science of positive psychology has sprung up,
which has eliminated from its domain all notion of a metaphysical entity
as a support for psychological phenomena.
But the above is not true in the social and juridical domain which has
remained encumbered with metaphysical entities, to which, owing to the
ever persisting influence of religious need, we still tend to attribute a
* The translation of M. Duguit's manuscript is by Professor Ernest G.
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supernatural power and a direct and sovereign effect. Notwithstand-
ing the influence of Auguste Comte and the entire positive school, our
social and juridical learning is still encumbered with actual mysticism;
and one could rightly speak of a social religion or mysticism.
The most persistent source of this metaphysical need and of this
social mysticism is doubtless the concept of subjective right, a concept
inadmissible in positive science, and concerning which Auguste Comte
has justly said :"
"The word right [referring to subjective right] must be discarded
from any true political language, as the word cause from any true
philosophical language. Of these two theologico-metaphysical concepts
the one (that of right) is henceforth immoral and anarchical, just as the
other (that of cause) is irrational and sophistical ..... .A true right
can exist only in so far as definite authority can proceed from super-
natural wills. The metaphysics of the last five centuries introduced
so-called human rights, which admitted only of a negative function, for
the purpose of fighting these theocratic authorities. Whenever the
attempt was made to give to them a truly organic place, they soon mani-
fested their anti-social nature, by always tending to hallow individuality.
In the Positive State which does not recognize any celestial title, the idea
of right disappears irrevocably. . . . . In other words, no one
possesses other rights than that of always doing his duty."
People cling nevertheless to this idea of subjective right, a purely
metaphysical concept, inexplicable and unexplained, which brings in its
train a mass of other ideas as inexplicable and unexplained, for example,
the ideas of juristic person, subject of rights, transfer of rights. And
so we find the juridical and political sciences encumbered with meta-
physical rubbish, from which certain individuals and myself have
struggled for almost forty years to free them.
I
Nowhere has this metaphysical idea of a subjective right main-
tained itself so strongly as in the field of general public law and in
the idea of the state. Indeed it has been attempted to make of the
latter a real being, invested with a superior will, a will of power,
imperium, sovereignty (all these terms are synonymous), commanding
personality, the possessor of a subjective right distinctive in character,
which enables it never to be limited, except by itself, and to impose as
such its will upon all other wills which may be within a particular terri-
tory. All that is pure imagination, mysticism, or metaphysics. The
state is a fact, nothing but a fact-the fact of political differentiation.
It is said that a state exists when in a given society, within a particular
territory, there is a person or a group of persons stronger in fact than
the rest and able to impose upon the others, by material constraint,
obedience to his or its will. This power of constraint was established as
the result of a slow and complex evolution, which has varied with
1 Systbmie de politique positive (3. 6d. i8go) 361.
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different countries. It was brought about sometimes by moral forces,
sometimes by economic forces, sometimes by purely material force. It
makes little difference which. This greater force became organized
and thereafter it was said that a society was a state. Ihering and
Treitschke were therefore right when they said that the state is power.
But we must add that the state is power limited by law, as I shall prove
a little later.
This power actually established has often been a cause of misery, of
suffering and of death for the people. But if it has often done wrong,
it has also often been the source of good; and Ihering could justly say
that the absence of a state would constitute for society a much greater
misfortune than the existence of a tyrannical and cruel state. On the
whole a state renders more service than it causes harm. Early in the
history of mankind people became accustomed to regard it as legitimate
and its power as entitled to obedience. They naturally attempted to
explain and justify this power, and in doing so had recourse first to
theological process, and thereafter to metaphysical imagination.
It was said at first that the power of the state was a creation of the
divine power, but when religious belief waned, appeal was made to
metaphysical belief, the foundation of which is not more substantial. It
was said that the state was a juridical person in whom was vested the
public power conceived of as a right. Or it was affirmed that the sov-
ereignty was vested in the nation as such because its personality was
wider than the individual personalities and consequently could enforce
its orders with respect to them, the state being thus nothing but the
organized nation. Or it was said, after the German school, that the
state is, that the state as such possesses sovereign power, that it exer-
cises it through its organs, which express only its will, the nation being
at times one of these organs.
I call brief attention to these doctrines to show to what inextricable
complications the persistence of religious and metaphysical conceptions
in the political and social science leads. For many centuries the nature
of the state has been disputed, and yet no step forward has been made,
could be 'nade, in its solution.
II
And even this is nothing when compared with the impotence and con-
fusion resulting from the attempt to determine the principle of a
juridical limitation placed upon the power of the state.
That the state is power is not doubtful, whatever the conception
which we may entertain concerning it (the state). But man feels an
irresistible need of finding the principle of a legal rule limiting this
power. This is an aspiration which, one might say, has filled the human
heart and mind ever since there were men conscious of their individual
and social life. Today, more than ever, a solution of the problem is
demanded. The modern man is imbued with the idea that those wield-
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ing public power possess with respect to their subjects duties rather than
rights. Saint Augustine as early as the fifth century wrote: "Those
who command serve those whom they appear to command." 2 And
President Wilson in his Labor Day Message in September, 1918, said of
the great war: "It is war of emancipation. Not until it is won can men
live anywhere free from constant fear or breathe freely while they go
about their daily tasks and know that Governments are their servants,
not their masters."
And yet, if one maintains that the state possesses sovereignty, that is,
that it possesses the.subjective right to impose its will as such, if one
maintains that the will of the state is sovereign, that is, that it has the
characteristic of being never limited except by itself, and of being able
to limit the extent and object of its action, it is quite impossible to fix a
juridical limit for the state. Theories have not been lacking, but they
have all remained ineffectual. This is particularly true of the indi-
vidualistic theory, notwithstanding its celebrity and the great influence
which it has doubtless had. It leads necessarily to Stirner's theory of
anarchism and to J. J. Rousseau's and Robespierre's theories of absolu-
tism. In addition it is powerless to determine the positive obligations
resting upon the state and to limit its action in the domain of international
relations or to lay the foundation of international law. To reconcile
the limitation of the state with the principle that it is sovereign, the
German authors have invented the doctrine of the self-limitation of the
state. They teach that the state has the power of self-determination,
but it may limit itself, either by the laws which it enacts, or by the
conventions into which it enters, and that within the sphere of its laws
and its contracts it is therefore limited by law, though remaining sov-
ereign, because, in prescribing limits for itself, it limits itself only by its
own will.
Ihering, the promoter of this doctrine, writes :4
"The authority of the State itself should respect the norms issued by
it . . . . Only in this way is chance banished in the application of the
norms; and in place of arbitrariness comes uniformity, security, reliabil-
ity of the law. This is what we understand by legal-order, present to
our mind when we speak of the sovereignty of right and law; and such
is the demand that we make of the law if it is to correspond to that
idea of it which we carry within us. It is the problem of the legal
State.
"Law, therefore, in this full sense of the word means the bilaterally
binding force of the statute; self-subordination on the part of the
State authority to the laws issued by it."
Jellinek has taken up again this doctrine of self-limitation, and, not-
withstanding his great skill, has not been able to prevent it being
'De Civitate Dei XIX, 14.
'N. Y. Timms, Sept. 2, 1918, p. I, col. 3.
' I Rudolf von Ihering, Der Zweck irn Recht (4 te. Aufl. 19o4) 278, translation
by Husik, under title Law as a Means to at; End (1913) 267.
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noticed that it is a veritable sleight-of-hand performance. A volun-
tary subordination is no subordination. A state is not really limited by
law if this law is laid down and formulated solely by itself and can be
changed by it at every moment as it pleases. Moreover, the German
jurists do not in the least conceal the fact that this must be so, in the
domain of international as well as in that of internal law, and they also
do not fail to assert the same idea as Treitschke. They surround it
with a juridical apparatus, but it is not on that account less baneful for
the peace of the world. Jellinek, certainly the most eminent German
jurist during the last forty years, has not hesitated to write: "Where
the observance of international law comes into conflict with the
existence of the State the rule of law must yield, as the State stands
higher than any particular rule of law, as the study of the relations of
internal public law have already shown us. International law exists for
the States and not the States for international law." 5
III
Does it not follow clearly that the juridical limitation of the state
cannot be placed upon a solid basis except by denying both the person-
ality and the sovereignty of the state? These are metaphysical concep-
tions which are without reality, an artificial creation of the human mind,
which lead to absolutist policies within and to policies of conquest and
plunder without. The individuals invested with public power are men
like the rest. They are neither the representatives nor the organs of
a supposed sovereign collectivity. Like all the other members of the
social body, they are subordinated to the rule of law. Both those in
authority and those governed are subject to the law and it is this
subordination which constitutes the subordination of the state to the
law.
That a rule of law imposes itself upon all people belonging to a given
society is not subject to serious dispute. The social fact itself is above
all a fact of solidarity by the division of labor. People have united in
society and live together because they have a certain number of identical
needs which they can realize only through a common life. But they
remain united in society mainly because they have different needs and
also different aptitudes and because they can secure the satisfaction of
these wants by an exchange of reciprocal services owing to the different
aptitudes of each. Nearly a century' ago Hegel showed that we could
find in this the constitutive element of all human society; he called it
'the system of needs. The demonstration was taken up again and made
in a final manner by Durkheim about twenty years ago in his excellent
work, De la division du travail social.6
As man can live only in society and as a society cannot live except
5Allgemeine Staatslehre (9o) 339.
6(893).
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by an exchange of reciprocal services, owing to the different aptitudes
of each, every man from the very fact that he lives in society has the
imperative duty to develop as far as he can his individual activity, his
personal aptitudes, and to do everything corresponding to his situation
in the society and to his individual capacity. This social duty imposes
itself upon all members of the collectivity without exception. Upon
it every juridical system is based.
But, it will be objected, this concept of social duty is itself a meta-
physical concept just like the concept of right, and if one rejects every
metaphysical concept one can speak no more of duty than of right.
The objection is not to the point because I have not in view the correla-
tive of a right when speaking of duty. I do not have in view a certain
subordination of one will to another. In saying that all men living in
a society have the duty to develop their personal activity so far as possi-
ble, I mean to say only that the wills are naturally, and as a consequence
of the social fact itself, subjected to the social discipline, and that if
they do not conform to it, a certain social reaction, a social disorder,
will necessarily follow which reacts upon the individuals themselves.
Individuals are subordinated to the social discipline, to the social law,
just as all beings of this world are subject to a certain law, just as the
cells that make up a living being are subject to the biological law of
their being. Man, however, may become conscious of his subordina-
tion to such law; and it is probable, on the other hand, that the cells
of which a living being is made up are not conscious of it. And in this
way I answer at the same time the objection which has been made often
to all positive doctrines and which, under different forms, has been
constantly made to my theory of rights and of the state, the objection,
namely, that the concept of duty cannot be based upon a fact, but only
upon some higher principle. That is true if one regards duty as the cor-
relative of a right, the subordination of an inferior will to a superior will.
It is not true if, like myself, one regards duty as the condition of a more
or less conscious being governed in his action by a natural law. This
law shows itself to us in the character of a normative law because it is
applicable to conscious beings; but, in final analysis, it is not different
from the laws governing the physical world or the animal world.
We do not think of speaking of economic rules or of rules of custom
as being connected with a superior principle or as having a metaphysical
basis. Rules of law are never anything but economic rules or rules of
custom which at a given moment acquire juridical character because the
collective consciousness thinks that they are of such an importance for
the social life that they should receive social sanction. If rules of custom
and economic rules have an exclusively social and positive basis, I do
not see why it should be otherwise with juridical rules. But however
that may be, this question is of little importance. The existence of a
rule of law which imposes itself upon all men living in society must be
affirmed as an indestructible postulate, whatever basis may be given to
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it, and it is this rule of law which limits positively and negatively, not
the sovereign person of the state, which does not exist, but those in
authority, that is, the individuals, in whom the power of coercion is in
fact vested in a particular territory.
IV
Persons in authority are individuals, like the rest. Whatever the
name given to them or assumed by them-kings, emperors, consuls,
presidents of a republic, senators, deputies-their will is human and has
no special character to give it any superiority whatever over other wills.
Only they wield in fact a power greater than the other individuals.
Just like these, they are subject to the rule of law which imposes upon
them the duty to act according to their peculiar aptitudes and to employ
the greatest force at their command for the realization of the social
needs. Among these needs there are some of such a nature that if the
activity which assures their realization were interrupted for a single
moment, such a disturbance would result therefrom for society that its
very life might be imperilled. The persons in authority are there-
fore under a juridical duty to employ the greatest force at their com-
mand to assure the accomplishment without interruption of these
activities of collective interest which, at a given moment, are indispensa-
ble in a particular society in order that it may live and develop.
And this is the fundamental concept of public service, which I define:
Every activity of general interest which is of such an importance to the
entire collectivity that those in authority are under a duty to insure its
accomplishment in an absolutely continuous manner, even by the use of
force. Those in authority are thus under a duty to insure without
interruption the operation of the public services, because they are, as
members of the society like all the rest, subject to the social discipline
which obliges them to act in conformity to their corndition and means of
action.
It will be perceived that if those in authority have the duty imposed
upon them to insure the operation of public services without interrup-
tion, they may legitimately do all acts, formulate all orders, and
accomplish all material operations whose aim it is to secure the operation
of public services. If they meet with resistance they can legitimately
overcome it by force, but in so acting they do not exercise a claim of
power, a sovereignty. They fulfill only the duty which the rule of law
has imposed upon them, and if the people governed are obliged to act
upon the orders of those in authority, they in turn submit only to the
rule of law.
The state thus ceases to-be a sovereign power which commands. It
is a co6peration of public services, constituted, regulated, directed, and
controlled by those in authority, who in doing so fulfill the obligation
imposed upon them by the rule of law based upon the social solidarity.
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Logically it follows that obedience is owed to those in authority only
so long as they command with reference to a public service, and to
the extent that they act toward the same end. It follows also that in
all well organized countries there should exist a right of recourse
against all acts whatever of those in authority which exceed the aim of
public service, be it through an act of legislation, or through an individ-
ual act. French public law is very advanced in this respect owing to
the remarkable procedure known as recours pour excbs de pouvoir.
V
This concept of public service, which in my opinion occupies the first
rank in the public law of all modem nations, has met nevertheless with
some objections. It is said in the first place that it is a vague and
changing concept. I deny that it is vague. It is doubtless changing;
and I see in that a proof that it is true.
The concept of an activity which is of such an importance for the
social life that it cannot be interrupted for a single moment is some-
thing very plain and precise. But it is certain that the nature and
number of the activities of collective interest which present this charac-
ter are greatly varying. The r6le of the state, the extent of its action,
mist necessarily vary according to times and countries; and there is
no doubt that at the present time it is increasing every day. For a long
time people asked from the state only protection against an enemy with-
out, order and security within. Only three public services were dis-
cerned: that of war, to protect the territory and the collectivity against
foreign attacks-that of police, and that of justice, in order that
security, tranquility, and order might reign in the country.
Today it is recognized, on the other hand, that the state has obliga-
tions much more extensive and much more numerous. Because of the
constantly increasing substitution of a national for a domestic economy
we expect the state to insure the accomplishment of activities of a
greatly differing kind, which become so many public services, for
example, common carriage, the postal and telegraph service, the trans-
mission of electric power, and a whole series of different activities,
the number of which is increasing every day. On the other hand, the
modern conscience ascribes to those in authority new duties in the social
relations, and also for the alleviation of suffering and misery, and to
assure the intellectual and moral development of individuals, from
which a whole series of different public services have arisen, particularly
in matters of charity and education.
The number and extent of the services is after all of little importance.
What is essential to understand is that the cbncept of state sovereignty
is disappearing to give place to the concept of public service. We see
no longer in the state, we should no longer see in it, a power that com-
mands, but only persons in authority who organize public services and
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insure their operation because the social rule makes it their juridical
obligation. Hence, public law is no longer the totality of rules govern-
ing the relations between the state power and its subjects. It is the
totality of rules that have been established for the organization and
management of the public services. Law is not the command of a
sovereign state; it is a by-law governing a service or a group.
An administrative act is a juridical act of the same kind and char-
acter as private juridical acts if both are considered with reference to
their internal nature. Certain legislations, such as the French, may,
of course, establish different tribunals for the adjudication of the dis-
putes which may arise from either group of acts; this difference in
jurisdiction does not arise from the juridical nature of the acts consid-
ered, but solely because of a difference of aim to which each group
responds. At all events, the administrative act has always the same
character because it pursues always the same end-the realization of
a public service. The administrative act is not sometimes the act of an
authority which commands, sometimes the act of an official who man-
ages a service; it is always an act of management. The elaborate
theories which have been formulated in certain countries, and especially
in France, in order to establish two categories of administrative acts,
one having reference to acts of administration, and the other to acts
of authority, do not correspond to any reality and rest upon no basis.
Those in authority are obliged both to organize the public services
and to insure their operation according to the law of such service. It
follows that those governed ought to have means of recourse of a juris-
dictional character which will guarantee the performance of this double
obligation. The second is strongly sanctioned in France by the recourse,
the name of which I have already mentioned, the recours pour exc~s
de pouvoir. Anyone interested is competent to demand from the high
jurisdiction, which with us is the Conseil d'Etat, the annulment of any
act whatever emanating from any administrative authority whatever,
which is alleged to have been done in violation of law. The petitioner
does not have to prove the existence of a right. He alleges only that
those in authority or their agents have violated the law of the service,
and if he proves it the high court annuls the act complained of. A legal
proceeding, flexible and energetic, which protects the subject better than
any other against administrative despotism, and which has been estab-
lished under the constantly growing influence of the concept of public
service.
VI
Nowhere does the disappearance of the concept of sovereignty and
its replacement by that of public service appear more dearly than in the
development, increasing from day to day in most of the states and
notably in France, of the recognition of the pecuniary responsibility of
the state with reference to individuals who have been injured in the
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operation of a public service. As long as the concept of the sovereignty
of the state was dominant, the irresponsibility of the state was logically
deduced therefrom. Sovereignty and responsibility are indeed two
notions which are inconsistent. Sovereignty may be limited of course,
and, according to the individualistic conception, it is limited by the right
of the individual, just as it limits the latter's rights. These reciprocal
limitations are regulated and can be regulated only by the legislative
function of the sovereignty itself, constituting the law of the land. In
the end it is the sovereign state that creates the right, and one cannot
admit, therefore, that it can be responsible. According to the tradi-
tional conception, responsibility implies the violation of a right; and he
who creates a right by his sovereign will cannot violate it. As in
monarchical countries "le roi ne peut pas mal faire," and hence cannot
be responsible, so the democratic state, which is only the organized
sovereign nation, cannot commit a wrong, cannot be responsible.
It cannot be responsible by means of the law, which is the mere
expression of its sovereignty. Nor can it be responsible on account
of any executive, jurisdictional, or administrative acts. If these acts
are in conformity with law, the question of responsibility does not
arise either with respect to the state, or with respect to the public
official. If they are opposed to law, it does not arise with respect
to the state, since it has made the law, has created the right, and has
willed that this law be enforced. If it is not executed, or if it is
violated, the official has substituted his own will for that of the sov-
ereign state. There is therefore only one will that can be responsible-
that of the public official.
All that was very logical, so logical that the system appears to have
remained almost intact in many countries and notably in England and
in America. In France, on the other hand, the notion of the responsi-
bility of the state penetrates every day more into the domain of public
law, and that is both a consequence and a proof of the idea here devel-
oped-the constant substitution of the concept of public service for
the concept of sovereignty. If the state is obliged to organize public
services and to insure their operation, by that very fact it is obliged
to repair the harm which may result to one or more individuals from
the absence of a public service or from its bad operation. We may
say that the principle is today definitely recognized. Each time that
an injury is done to an individual, in connection with a public service,
the courts condemn the state to repair such injury. The decisions of
our Conseil d'Etat to this effect are very numerous. They no longer
distinguish, as they formerly tried to do, between the different public
services. They no longer speak of public services of authority and
public services of management. For example, they no longer dis-
tinguish between the public services of police as services of authority,
in connection with which the state could not be responsible, and the
public services such as the postal service, that of public instruction, of
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public works, iu connection with which the responsibility of the state
might be invoked. The principle of the responsibility of the state is
affirmed and applied in the one case, as in the other.
It even seems that a state of law is being formed according to which
the responsibility of the state may be invoked though there has been
no faulty operation of the public service, though no agent of the state
can be charged with any fault or negligence. In other words, the
state is looked upon as an insurer of the social risk incurred by the
subjects on account of the administration of the public services. These
are instituted and operated in the interest of all. Concomitantly it
seems just that the collective treasury should repair the prejudice
which has been caused to some in the interest of all. Several decisions
of the Conseil d'Etat have already sanctioned this idea. It should be
added that the converse should also be true, that is, if the operation
of the public service has been the occasion of exceptional benefit for one
or more individuals, they should be obliged to account therefor to the
common treasury and be compelled to pay into it a sum equivalent to
the benefit received. Indeed it is nothing but the application of
the great law of social solidarity that I am endeavoring to set forth
in this study.
The idea of the responsibility of the state penetrates the modem
public law so profoundly that the time is not far off when it will
be applied even to the state in its legislative activity. Of course,
if a law prohibits a harmful activity, which is in itself contrary to
law, it should not award an indemnity to those who, taking advan-
tage of the previous silence of the law, engaged in this activity and
now find themselves deprived of the illegitimate profit which they
derived therefrom. When laws were enacted in Switzerland and
in France prohibiting the manufacture, traffic, sale or consumption
of poisonous beverages, such as absinthe, the state owed no indem-
nity to the manufacturers or dealers who would suffer, as a result
of the prohibition, a certain and very considerable loss. But if.
on the contrary, the state should forbid to individuals the exercise
of a certain activity, perfectly lawful in itself, in order to confer
upon the state a monopoly thereof, as the legislators of Uruguay
and Italy have created a monopoly of insurance, there is no doubt
regarding its duty to reserve the principle of indemnity for the
benefit of those who have been injured by such legislation, and if'
it has not done* so, the courts are competent to award to such
parties a just indemnity.
This idea, I repeat, penetrates more and more the modem juri-
dical consciousness. Numerous applications are made of it by the
French courts. And if I have dwelt upon it somewhat at length, it has
been because to me there is no better proof, on the one hand, of the pro-
gressive disappearance of the idea of sovereignty, and, on the other, of
the raising of the fundamental concept of public service to the first
rank in modem nublic law.
